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GEORGE v. ANGELONE
100 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On June 16, 1990, Alexander Eugene Sztanko, at the age of 15, was
murdered. On the day of the murder, Sztanko drove his motorcycle into
the woods of Woodbridge, Virginia. There, he was tortured and then
killed by a single gun shot to the head. The next day, the boy's body was
found after the police confronted Michael Carl George in the area in
which Sztanko's body lay. George was carrying a map marking the
location of the body and the boy's bike. He was arrested and charged with
capital murder under § 18.2-31(4) of the Virginia Code (murder in the
commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon). 1
The jury convicted George and imposed a sentence of death, finding
both vileness in the murder of Sztanko and a probability that George
would be a future danger to society. George's conviction and death
sentence were upheld on appeal.2 The United States Supreme Court
denied George's petition for certiorari. 3 Subsequently, George filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court. His petition was denied.
The state habeas court concluded that each of George's claims, with the
exception of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, was barred
either because it was raised on direct appeal or was procedurally
defaulted by the failure to raise the claim during trial or on direct appeal.
4
The state habeas court also found that George's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim was without merit. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied
George's petition for review, and the United States Supreme Court
denied his petition for certiorari. 5
Thereafter, George filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal
district court. The district court dismissed his petition, holding that some
of his claims were procedurally defaulted and that the remainder lacked
merit. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), George moved
to alter or amend the judgment, asking the district court to modify its
judgment by making the dismissal of his Sixth Amendment claim
without prejudice. 6 The district court did so. George appealed the district
court's dismissal of his petition to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. The Commonwealth also appealed the district court's decision
to dismiss his Sixth Amendment claim without prejudice.
7
1 George v. Angelone, 100 F.3d 353, 355-56 (4th Cir. 1996).
2 George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 285, 411 S.E.2d 12, 24
(1991).
3 George v. Virginia, 503 U.S. 973 (1992).
4 For an in-depth analysis of this procedural application, see case
summary of Stout v. Netherland, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
5 George, 100 F.3d at 357.
6 At issue was a Massiahllenry claim where the Commonwealth
allegedly planted a jailhouse snitch to elicit information from George.
See infra discussion on procedural default under MassiahlHenry.
7 George, 100 F.3d at 356-57.
8 Id. at 365.
9 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (1996).
10 George, 100 F.3d at 358 (citing Branch v. Commonwealth, 225
Va. 91, 300 S.E.2d 758 (1983)).
11 Although there was considerable evidence to suggest that the
killing was motivated by George's sexual abnormalities, the court
HOLDING
TheFourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of George's
habeas corpus petition and modified the district court's ruling to deny his
Sixth Amendment claim, with prejudice, as procedurally defaulted.8
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Impermissible Use of Victim Impact Evidence
In order to convict George of capital murder, the Commonwealth
was required to prove that the murder was committed during the commis-
sion of a robbery with a deadly weapon.9 In addition, the Commonwealth
had to prove that the robbery was one of the motivating factors for the
killing. 10 The evidence of robbery was far from overwhelming in
George's case. The Commonwealth based its theory of robbery on
evidence that George hid Sztanko's motorcycle and helmet, later marking
their location on a topographical map. The Commonwealth contended
that the map was drawn by George with the intention of retrieving the
items at a later date.11
In light of the relatively weak evidence of robbery, the Common-
wealth apparently bolstered its case by including victim impact evidence
during the guilt phase of George's trial. The victim impact evidence was
likely presented because its emotional nature would increase the chance
that the jury would not be overly concerned with the weakness of the
evidence of the robbery predicate.
At the time of George's trial in 1991, victim impact evidence in
capital sentencing proceedings was forbidden. The Virginia Code at that
time excluded capital cases from the list of offenses for which victim
impact statements were permitted. 12 Currently, Virginia allows victim
impact evidence in a capital trial, under its 1996 version of § 19.2-299.1.
This marked change is due to the Supreme Court's holding in Payne v.
Tennessee.13 The Virginia statute was modified to permit victim impact
evidence after Payne overruled Booth v. Maryland14 and South Carolina
v. Gathers.15
rejected the claim that the helmet and bicycle were secreted only to help
George avoid detection for the murder, and found that robbery was at least
one motive for the murder. George, 100 F.3d at 355, 358.
12 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-299.1 (1991).
13501 U.S. 808,825 (1991) (holding that victim impact evidence is
admissible at the sentencing phase of a capital trial so long as it does not
violate fundamental fairness protected by the due process clause).
14 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (holding that introduction of victim impact
evidence describing personal characteristics of the victim and the emo-
tional impact of the crime on the victim's family violates the Eighth
Amendment).
15 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (death sentence was obtained in violation of
the constitution where the prosecutor, during closing argument, read
from a prayer found in the victim's possession and argued personal
characteristics of victim based upon prayer and voter registration card
also found among victim's possession); for further discussion, see case
summary of Payne, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. I, p. 14 (1991).
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In George, the Commonwealth's position was that the victim
impact evidence was permissible because the jury, in one proceeding,
found guilt or innocence on all charges, including capital murder and set
punishment for the non-capital offenses. The Commonwealth argued,
and the Fourth Circuit agreed, that the victim impact evidence was
presented for the jury to determine the punishment for the non-capital
offenses.
16
Since George, Virginia statutory changes not only permit victim
impact evidence at capital trials, but now non-capital sentencing is also
bifurcated. 17 This procedure raises the possibility, of course, of a
"trifurcated" capital trial, given the usual related non-capital charges.
That, however, is apparently not the practice. Rather, the penalty trials
are combined.
Since the tactic employed by the Commonwealth in George is
unlikely to arise under current practice, of more importance, for defense
counsel is the recognition that the content of prosecution arguments must
be limited. In light of the holding in Payne, it is important for defense
counsel to narrow the Commonwealth's use of victim impact evidence
to family members and close friends. Moreover, the Court stated in
Payne that victim impact evidence had a limited purpose: to show each
victim's uniqueness as an individual human being. 18 Therefore, defense
counsel should attempt to confine the Commonwealth to a limited
showing of victim impact evidence fitting within the definition of
Payne.19
II. Godfrey and the "Vileness" Factor
At the sentencing phase of George's trial, thejury instruction given
by the court plainly violated Godfrey v. Georgia.20 The instruction given
in George was identical to that found inadequate in Godfrey. In both
George and Godfrey, the jury instruction at issue merely parroted the
language of the statute without any further clarification or narrowing
construction.
21
George did not default his Godfrey claim. It was squarely presented
and erroneously decided in the Supreme Court of Virginia. Nevertheless,
the court of appeals held that the unconstitutional vileness instruction
used by the Commonwealth was harmless error because the jury con-
victed him of capital murder and also found that there was a probability
16 George, 100 F.3d at 360.
17 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-295.1.
18 Payne, 501 U.S. at 822, citing, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1987).
19 Forfurtherdiscussion of the limitation of victim impact evidence,
see Jonathan H. Levy, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument
After Payne v. Tennessee, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1043 (1993).
20 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (holding that the death sentence was
invalid because the state court failed to provide a constitutional limiting
construction to the aggravating circumstance of vileness). George's
assertion that the evidence of the defilementof Sztanko was inadmissable
as it was prejudicial under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
clause failed because the evidence was found to be relevant to George's
guilt. 100 F.3d at 361-62.
21 While denying the need for a narrowing construction, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has further defined the aggravators in Smith v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978). While defense
counsel contend that the definitions remain inadequate and the United
States Supreme has never approved of the definitions, they have been
upheld by Fourth Circuit. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th
Cir. 1996), and case summary of O'Dell, Capital Defense Journal, Vol.
9, No. 1, p.29 (1996); Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994),
and case summary of Turner, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p.
15 (1994).
that George would be a danger in the future. One of the several flaws in
the court's harmless error analysis is that the wrong court is making it.
Virginia's capital scheme does not require a formal "weighing" of
aggravating and mitigating factors by the sentencer. The United States
Supreme Court addressed the situation presented by George in Stringer
v. Black.
22
The Stringer Court stated that there is a distinction of "critical
importance" between weighing and non-weighing states. The Court
assessed this distinction by stating:
In a nonweighing State, so long as the sentencing body finds
at least one valid aggravating factor, the fact that it also finds
an invalid aggravating factor does not infect the formal process
of deciding whether death is an appropriate penalty. Assum-
ing a determination by the state appellate court that the
invalid factor would not have made a difference to the
jury's determination, there is no constitutional violation
resulting from the introduction of the invalid factor in an
earlier stage of the proceedings. 23
According to Stringer, the Virginia sentencing scheme does not
lead to a constitutional violation when an invalid aggravating factor is
used if the state appellate court determines that the invalid factorplayed
no part in the jury's determination. In George, the state appellate court
did not make this determination. Instead, the Fourth Circuit went outside
its authority in making a de novo finding of harmless error.24
Also, the court, apparently, bolstered its harmless error finding by
reference to the fact that the Supreme Court of Virginia had conducted
statutory review of George's death sentence. If the court relied on that
statutory review, it erred. The United States Supreme Court has rejected
the contention that this review automatically corrects Godfrey error.25
Il. Procedural default under MassiahiHenry
Finally, George asserted that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was violated by the Commonwealth's placing an inmate snitch in
George's cellblock in violation of Massiah v. United States26 and United
States v. Henry.27 The district court ruled that George's claim was
22 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
23 Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
24Both Clemons and Stringer were reaffirmed in Sochor v. Florida,
504 U.S. 527 (1992). Another possible error is the standard the court
employed for harmless error review. Presumably, the Fourth Circuit, in
habeas review, applied the standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619 (1993), which requires a showing, by the defendant, that the
constitutional violation had a substantial and injurious effect on the
determination of the jury's verdict. Brecht is more generous to the
prosecution. If the correct court, the Supreme Court of Virginia, had
conducted the review, it presumably would have been required to apply
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), compelling the Common-
wealth to show the Godfrey error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
25 Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992); see also case summary
of Sochor, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992).
26377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding that the Sixth Amendment prohib-
its extraction of incriminating statements from an indicted person with-
out the presence of counsel).
27 447 U.S. 264 (1980) (holding conduct of the police in asking
Henry's cellmate to report back defendant's incriminating comments
created a situation likely to induce Henry to make these statements,
meeting the "deliberately elicited" test in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment).
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procedurally defaulted and dismissed it without prejudice. The Fourth
Circuit modified this ruling by declaring that George's claim was
defaulted and dismissed it with prejudice because George failed to
demonstrate cause for the default.
28
George claimed that he failed to include his MassiahlHenry claim
in his state habeas petition because he did not discover the underlying
facts supporting it until his case reached federal habeas. The Fourth
Circuit held that the fact that George's habeas counsel had only one
month in which to investigate all of George's claims did not mean that
the facts regarding the inmate were unavailable to George when he filed
his state habeas petition.29 This result is based on an erroneous reading
of the Virginia statutory procedures for issuing an extraordinary writ.
Section 8.01-654 of the Virginia Code sets out the procedure for
issuing an extraordinary writ. A person seeking an extraordinary writ
must apply by petition. Thepetition "shall contain all allegations the facts
of which are known to petitioner at the time of the filing .... No writ shall
be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had
knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition."30 The court, in
analyzing George's claim, erroneously injected the term "could have
known" into the language of § 8.01-654(B)(2). Therefore, it was error to
default George's claim on the basis that he could have known of the
MassiahlHenry facts; rather, the court should have determined whether
he actually knew of those facts. The Fourth Circuit made this same error
in both Barnes v. Thompson31 and Hoke v. Netherland.32
In Barnes the Fourth Circuit held that Barnes's Brady claim was
defaulted becauseproof of theexculpatory evidence was eitherknown or
"reasonably available" to him. 33 The Barnes court cited Wainwright v.
Sykes34 for the proposition that if a state prisoner defaults a federal claim,
the prisoner can no longer raise the defaulted claim unless cause or
prejudice exists. However, theBarnescourtmisapplied § 8.01-654(B)(2)
by including a requirement that facts "reasonably available" to a peti-
tioner must be asserted and that absence of such facts operates as a
grounds for default. According to the court in Barnes, the governing
question was not simply whether Barnes knew of the Brady evidence, but
"whether Barnes could have obtained the information through 'reason-
able and diligent investigation.' ' 35
A similar misreading of § 8.01-654(B)(2) by the Fourth Circuit
occurred in Hoke. Like Barnes, Hoke accused the Commonwealth of
violating Brady by not divulging exculpatory evidence. In ruling that
Hoke defaulted his Brady claim, the court held that the defendant could
have obtained this information through reasonably diligent investiga-
tion; therefore, he could not establish "cause for that default such as to
enable him to overcome this procedural bar in federal court.' 36 The
Fourth Circuit misapplied § 8.01-654(B)(2) in both Hoke and Barnes,
and built upon this error in George.
In George's case, the Commonwealth denied that the inmate was
planted to obtain information from George. 37 That denial in itself should
28 George, 100 F.3d at 365.
29 Id. at 363.
30 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(B)(2) (emphasis added).
31 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1995).
32 92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1996).
33 58 F.3d at 977.
34433 U.S. 72 (1977).
35 Barnes, 58 F.3d at 975 (quotingMcCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,
498 (1991)).
3692 F.3d at 1354-55 n. l.
37 George, 100 F.3d at 363 n.12.
38473 U.S. 667 (1985).
39 Id. at 682.
have been weighed in George's favor, even if the proper question was
whether counsel "could have known" facts in support of the claim earlier.
Such a denial by the prosecution leads defense counsel to believe that the
requested evidence does not exist. As the United States Supreme Court
held in United States v. Bagley,38 "an incomplete response to a specific
request not only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but also has the
effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist."39
A similar Massiah denial was made by the state of Georgia in
McCleskey v. Zant.40 McCleskey had failed to include his Massiah claim
in his first federal habeas petition. The Supreme Court ruled that for cause
to exist, an "external impediment, whether it be government interference
or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for the claim, must
have prevented petitioner from raising the claim."41 The Court ruled that
the unavailability of a 21-page document at McCleskey's first federal
habeas petition did not give sufficient cause for the failure to include the
Massiah claim. The Court held that McCleskey had "constructive
knowledge" of the facts that were contained in the document and,
therefore, could have raised his Massiah claim in a timely manner.
42
Although McCleskey alleged that the state engaged in wrongful conduct
by concealing the 21-page document, the Court held that there was no
misconduct by the State.
43
The Court also held thatMcCleskey's reliance onAmadeo v. Zant
44
was misplaced. In Amadeo, the Court stated that the concealment of
evidence by the government may constitute cause for a procedural
default if it "was the reason for the failure ofapetitioner's lawyers to raise
the jury challenge in the trial court." 45 The Court ruled that McCleskey
did not satisfy Amadeo because there was no evidence of state conceal-
ment, and even if there had been evidence of concealment on the part of
the state, McCleskey had constructive knowledge of the information
contained in the 21-page document.
46
The holding in McCleskey and Amadeo would have supported
George's MassiahlHenry claim had he been able to show some type of
concealment on the part of the Commonwealth. Even if he were unable
to do so, it is clear that the Fourth Circuit has misread Va. Code Ann. §
8.01-654. George's MassiahlHenry claim was not procedurally de-
faulted if he did not have actual knowledge of the facts surrounding the
claim prior to his state habeas petition.
The court also rejected George's contention that he had inadequate
time to investigate his claim prior to filing his state habeas petition. The
court faulted him for his delay in requesting counsel after the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari, yet George's case proceeded in
a system that had no filing deadlines for state or federal review.
Finally, changes in state law and the passage of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 will make matters even worse
for defense counsel. 47 Defense counsel now have a severely limited
amount of time to investigate claims for their inclusion in state and
federal habeas petitions. It is advisable for counsel to investigate as
40499 U.S. 467 (1991).
41 Id. at 497.
42 Id. at 500.
431d. at 501.
44486 U.S. 214 (1988).
45 Id. at 222.
46 499 U.S. at 502.
47 For a discussion of ATEDA, see Raymond, The Incredible
Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of1996, Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 52
(1996); Eade, The Incredible Shrinking Writ, Part 11: Habeas Corpus
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
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quickly and diligently as possible and make a record of all external
impediments (denial of discovery, the lack of timely discovery by the
Commonwealth, governmentconcealment ofevidence, insufficient time
for meaningful investigation) so that claims will not be defaulted and
there will remain at least a chance that facts may be further developed in
federal court. On a final note, McCleskey and George make clear that any
claim with a mere scintilla of evidence to support it must be included at
every stage of collateral review.
Summary and analysis by:
Deborah A. Hill
BUCHANAN v. ANGELONE
103 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On September 15, 1987, Douglas McArthur Buchanan, Jr. brought
his rifle to his father's house. After an argument about his natural mother,
the defendant shot his father through the back of the head. Then he waited
for his two half-brothers to return home from school. Upon their arrival,
Buchanan shot both brothers. One died. The other survived the shooting,
but Buchanan subsequently stabbed him to death with a kitchen knife.
When his step-mother later arrived at the home, Buchanan attempted to
shoot her. Unsuccessful, he resorted to stabbing her with the kitchen
knife, delivering lethal wounds to her neck. 1
The Commonwealth charged Buchanan with capital murder of
'more than one person as part of the same act or transaction."2 A grand
jury issued four separate indictments for first degree murder.3 Buchanan
also faced four counts of using a firearm in the commission of a murder.
4
At the end of his trial in Amherst County, ajury found Buchanan guilty
on all charges and sentenced him to death for the capital murder of his
father.5
Buchanan exhausted his direct appeal and state habeas proceedings.
He then filed apetition fora writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.
The court denied relief and Buchanan appealed.
6
I Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 394-95, 384 S.E.2d
757, 760-61 (1989).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7).
3 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32.
4 Va. Code Ann § 18.2-53.1.
5 Buchanan v. Angelone, 103 F.3d 344, 346-47 (1996). Although
not expressly stated in the opinion, or in the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Virginia, the jury appears to have predicated Buchanan's death
sentence on a finding of "vileness".
6 Id. at 347.
7 Id. at 351.
8Three of the court's rulings will not be discussed in this summary.
Some of the rulings provide little if any guidance because they apply
broad, settled principles of law to facts that are specific to the case being
reviewed. These holdings are (1) trial counsel was not ineffective by not
suggesting the defendant plead guilty to the first degree murder indict-
ments so that double jeopardy would preclude a sentence of death. The
court correctly applied the holding of Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493
(1984), that pleading guilty to the lesser included offenses does not bar
the state from prosecuting the greater offenses if it brought all charges in
HOLDING
The court of appeals found no error in the district court's denial of
Buchanan's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and affirmed its judg-
ment.7
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Inadequate Instruction Regarding Mitigating Evidence
A. A General Instruction Failed to Guide the Jury's
Discretion
In the first of his five claims, 8 Buchanan alleged that the trial court
inadequately instructed the jury about mitigating evidence by refusing to
give specific and detailed instructions regarding mitigating evidence as
defined in Va. Code Ann § 19.2-264.4, such as his youth, absence of prior
criminal record, and the influence of an extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.9 Instead, the trial court instructed thejury, "[I]f you believe
from all the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall
fix the punishment of the defendant at life imprisonment." 10 The court
the same prosecution; (2) the Supreme Court of Virginia conducted a
sufficient proportionality review; (3) having failed to raise the issue on
direct appeal, Buchanan was barred from assigning error for the trial
court's failure to instruct on second degree murder.
9Buchanan, 103 F.3d at 347. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B) states:
"Facts in mitigation may include, but shall not be limited to,
the following: (i) The defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity, (ii) the capital felony was committed
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance, (iii) the victim was a participant in
the defendant's conduct or consented to the act, (iv) at the time
of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was signifi-
cantly impaired, (v) the age of the defendant at the time of the
commission of the capital offense or (vi) mental retardation of
the defendant."
101d.
